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The first chapter studies the effects of financial obstacles to productiv-
ity improvement in the context of trade reforms, by constructing a dynamic
heterogeneous firms model with financial frictions. Trade reforms are con-
sidered beneficial because they confront the liberalized country’s firms with
more competition from abroad and increase their incentives to become more
efficient. This implies that if poor countries do not improve their productivi-
ties they might lose the intended gains from liberalization. Financial frictions
however have been quoted an important obstacle for firms to improve their
productivities. To address these issues, first, using data on 15 trade liber-
alization episodes, I document that more financially developed countries ex-
perienced more productivity growth after their trade liberalization. Second,
I construct a dynamic heterogeneous firms model with financial frictions in
financing costs for productivity improvement. Calibrated numerical exercises
vi
show that if a country does not improve its financial intermediaries at the out-
set of trade liberalization it may lose as much as %40 of potential output gains
and productivity improvements. The result has policy implications regarding
the simultaneous reforms in trade and financial intermediaries.
The second chapter is a cross country empirical analysis aiming to pro-
vide evidence for the effects of trade openness and financial development on
firms decision to upgrade their technology and the impact on the distribution
of firm size across countries. The idea is that reduction of trade barriers is
likely to affect incentives of bigger firms to grow to export markets as well as
incentives of smaller firms to innovate due to increased competition. Financial
frictions, however are likely to limit the scope of these decisions and more so for
smaller firms and capital intensive industries. This is likely to have heteroge-
neous effects on firms leading to changes in firm size distribution. I hypothesize
that a combination of trade openness and low financial development increases
the relative size of big to smaller firms. To test this hypothesis, I take ad-
vantage of cross country/industry differences in trade protection and financial
development/needs to provide enough variation for identifying these effects.
Using establishment level data from OECD countries, I provide evidence for
this hypothesis, by performing double difference estimations. In addition using
firm level data on 20,000 firms from World Bank’s enterprise survey, I provide
more evidence that trade openness promotes productivity growth particularly
for bigger firms in less financially developed countries. The finding contributes
to the literature on importance of finance for firm growth by focusing on the
vii
channel of heightened competition due to trade. It highlights the importance
of incorporating financial aspects of a country in trade analysis.
The third chapter is an exercise exploring the welfare gains of trade in
a North-South trade where counties are asymmetric in their ability to produce
more sophisticated goods. The exercise is based on the model by Matsuyama
(JPE 2000), where the world is a static Ricardian model with a continuum of
goods and unit demand non-homothetic preferences. One country (the south)
has comparative advantage in production of goods with lower income elasticity
of demand. As a result, over time with uniform global improvement in technol-
ogy in the form of smaller unit labor requirements, the terms of trade moves
against south. The numerical exercise, calibrates stochastic interpretation of
the model to for a specific choice of countries and provides evidence that over
time, if the patterns of specializations are not changed drastically, the country
specialized in production of less sophisticated goods disproportionately grows
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Chapter 1
Productivity Upgrade, Financial Frictions and
International Trade
This paper studies the effects of financial obstacles to productivity im-
provement in the context of trade reforms by constructing a dynamic hetero-
geneous firms model with financial frictions. It is widely argued that trade
liberalization benefits countries by reallocation of resources towards sectors in
which the country has a comparative advantage. This implies that if poor
countries do not improve their productivities in tradable sectors they might
lose the intended gains from liberalization. Financial frictions, however, have
been identified as an important obstacle for firms to improve their produc-
tivities. To address these issues, first, using data on 15 trade liberalization
episodes, I document that countries with higher level of financial develop-
ment have experienced higher productivity growth after trade liberalization.
Second, to quantify the importance of financial development, I construct a
dynamic heterogeneous firms model with frictions in financing productivity
improvement. Calibrated numerical exercises show that if a country does not
improve its financial intermediaries at the outset of trade liberalization it loses
40% of its potential output gains. This finding has policy implications for
simultaneous reforms in trade and financial sector.
1
1.1 Introduction
Trade reforms are considered beneficial because they confront the lib-
eralized country’s firms with more competition from abroad and increase their
incentives to become more efficient. Numerous studies show that trade re-
forms have different effects across heterogeneous firms within each industry.
While more productive firms self select to export and earn more profits, less
productive ones might lose business to the increased competition. This is the
typical channel through which trade reforms increase sectoral productivity by
moving away business from less to more productive firms. A less studied chan-
nel, which is the focus of this paper, is that trade reforms increase the option
value of innovation. The anticipation of trade reform increases the incentives
of less productive firms to invest in their productivity to survive the increased
competition. It is also likely to affect the incentives of bigger firms to be-
come more productive in order to reap gains from the opportunity of access
to bigger markets. It is thus important to study the firms decision to innovate
at the outset of trade reforms when they are particularly likely to make such
decisions1.
Financial obstacles, however, limit the scope of firms’ decisions to in-
novate, invest in their productivity, buy new machinery, undertake research
and development and a host of other activities to grow (Levine 2004). While
1A new and growing literature focuses on the importance of joint decision of firms to
export and innovate (see Bustos (2006), Verhoogen (2006), Trefler (2004), Costantini and
Melitz (2007)).
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financial and legal institutions of a country affect the overall availability and
ease of obtaining finance, usually smaller firms are more likely to be more
constrained than larger firms (Beck et al 2005). Financial development affects
the key aspects of firm investment decision and consequently the aggregate
industry growth and productivity. It is thus, particularly crucial in a trade
reform because it directly affects the possibility of productivity improvement,
a goal intended by trade reforms.
This paper has two contributions. First, I document that in countries
with higher financial development, trade reforms brought about more pro-
ductivity growth. I employ UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development
Organization) sectoral level data on 16 trade liberalization episodes between
1976 and 2000 to compare before and after changes in productivity growth.
My empirical analysis shows that countries that had better financial interme-
diaries, such as New Zealand, Spain, Hungry and Uruguay, at the outset of
their trade reforms experienced higher productivity growth compared to the
less financially developed countries, such as Mexico and Sri Lanka. These
effects are significant and on average amount to %18 extra growth in produc-
tivity in three years for a more financially developed country (such as Spain
with private credit to GDP ratio of %75 at time of reform) compared to less
financially developed ones (such as Mexico, with private credit to GDP ratio
of %13). Second, to better quantify the effects of financial intermediaries on
productivity improvement, output and welfare, I construct a dynamic model
of heterogeneous firms in a small open economy. Calibrated numerical ex-
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ercises show that if a country does not improve its financial intermediaries
along with the trade reform, it loses a large portion of gains in output and
productivity in the years after the trade reform. From a policy standpoint,
the study’s message is that improvement of financial intermediaries facilitates
the achievement of goals intended by trade reforms.
I construct a model of a small, open economy with financial frictions and
tariffs. The economy consists of a continuum of firms producing differentiated
products and is protected from foreign competition by imposing a tariff on
foreign goods. The firms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivities,
however each firm has the one time option to pay a sunk cost and improve its
productivity. The firms need to finance the costs up-front through the financial
intermediaries, which are less than perfect. I model the financial friction as
the inability of the lenders to fully insure themselves against the borrower’s
default risk. Therefore, the level of the debt will be limited by the strength
of the financial and legal institutions to reimburse the investors upon default.
Moreover, smaller borrowers will be able to borrow less and be requited to
save in order to partially finance the innovation costs by themselves. In the
equilibrium, the level of tariffs determines the competitive pressure and the
incentives of the firms to innovate. Lowering tariffs brings up the option
value of innovation as it directly affects future profits. In the presence of
financial frictions, the innovation decision is delayed, as some firms have to
accumulate savings to internally fund some part of the innovation costs. The
delayed innovation, in turn affects their relative productivity to other firms
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and adversely affects their profits and delays the innovation further. Some
output, export and productivity is lost due to presence of this friction. The
model is used to quantify these effects.
In the main part of the analysis, I calibrate the parameters of the model
to be similar to key features of Latin American countries during the 1980s,
which went through structural trade reforms. Mexico, Bolivia and Columbia
went through drastic tariff reductions during these decades. However, they did
not reform their financial sectors, nor did increase the financial intermediaries
during these reforms until years later. I study two scenarios. In one, the
country goes through tariff reduction but the level of financial intermediaries
does not change. In the other, the country reduces the tariff and improves
the financing as well. In both scenarios I solve for the equilibrium before
and after the reform2 The results indicate that in the presence of the frictions,
around 40% of potential output and productivity gains from reduction of trade
barriers is lost.
This paper contributes to the literature on the links between trade and
finance. In one branch of this literature, theoretical and empirical works by
Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Freitas (2003) , Beck (2003, 2004) and Mat-
suyama (2005) have focused on establishing the links between financial devel-
opment of a country and how it shapes the patterns of exports and comparative
2The transition paths to equilibrium will be incorporated soon. The transitions are
important as some welfare is lost due to the slower convergence towards the new equilibrium
in presence of financial frictions.
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advantage through affecting different industries in different ways. A new and
different branch of the literature incorporates financial frictions in the models
of heterogeneous firms and studies the implications of firms sorting into ex-
porters and non-exporters based on not only the productivities but also the
level of firm’s or country’s financial frictions. Chaney (2004) studies a model
where firms are liquidity constrained in financing the export costs. Manova
(2006) introduces frictions in financing the costs of export and explores how
it implies nuances in productivity cutoffs for export participation based on
sectoral needs to finance as well as each country’s level of financial develop-
ment. My paper is different from these papers as it incorporates the option
to improve firms productivities in an open economy context and models the
financial frictions associated with it. Focusing on the frictions associated with
innovation is of particular importance, as it is in the heart of how firms grow
and invest.
The paper also relates to the literature on growth and trade. While
the paper is not specifically about growth, it focuses on how trade affects the
option value of innovation and thus output growth. The link between trade
openness and growth has been empirically hard to establish (Rodriguez and
Rodrick 1999). Moreover recent papers such as Bajona et al (2008) point out
that standard models of trade do not necessarily imply links between trade
openness and real GDP growth, and to the extent that trade leads to growth
it might be through channels such as productivity improvement.
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My paper is similar to Kambourov (2008) in terms of incorporating in-
stitutional aspects of a country in trade reform analysis as well as the numerical
exercises performed. He incorporates the firing costs into the trade analysis of
Latin American countries and studies how it slows down the process of labor
reallocation after a trade reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 documents
the empirical facts that motivate my analysis; In section 1.3, the model is
developed; Section 1.4 describes the calibration to data, numerical exercises
and the results; Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Investigation
In this section, the empirical motivation of the paper is described. I
argue that among the several countries who went through trade liberalization,
there are differences in the level of productivity growth after the reform, and
this pattern coincides with the ordering of the level of their financial develop-
ment. In order to study the data more rigorously, I perform regressions on a
large number of trade reform episodes.
1.2.1 Trade Reform
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a larger number of developing coun-
tries began to reduce their levels of protection and to reform their development
strategies. Many countries, especially Latin American countries, had been im-
7
plementing import substitution policies for almost four decades by then and
had some of the highest tariff rates in the world. During the reform period,
tariffs were drastically reduced; in many countries, import licenses and prohi-
bitions were eliminated; and several countries started engaging in free trade
agreements regionally and beyond (see Edwards (94)). Kambourov (2008)
reports: ”The 1997 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) report states
that the average tariffs declined from 42% in 1986 to 14% in 1995, the average
tariff dispersion declined from 24% down to 5%, and maximum tariffs were
lowered from an average of 84% to 41%. In addition, non tariff restrictions
which affected 38% of imports in the pre-reform period covered only 6% of
imports in 1995”.
1.2.2 Financial Development
Potentially many country specific factors can affect the outcome of
trade reforms and their success in achieving the intended goals. Many of
the countries which implemented trade liberalization had been implementing
import substitution policies for years by protecting home industries from com-
petition with the more efficient foreign producers. This potentially distorted
the incentives to be more efficient and adopt new technologies. By lowering
the trade barriers, the protection shield is weakened and innovation becomes
a more attractive and necessary option. In this context, any impediment to
the innovation process can hinder the intended gains from trade reform. The
financial development of a country has been quoted an important institutional
8
feature of the country that affects the funds available to firms for investment
and growth (Levine 2004). This is a broad term that addresses the quality
and quantity of financial services available to firms. Many legal and techno-
logical factors have been considered as factors affecting financial development
(La Porta et. al, 1998, Djankov et. al, 2007). Availability of a public credit
bureau and effective record keeping system can lead to better evaluation of
creditworthiness and a more efficient financial system. Level of investor pro-
tection in law, cost or ease of bankruptcy and the effectiveness of legal system
in upholding contracts also affects the availability of credit. In addition, the
technological specificities of a firm or sector may also make it easier or harder
to determine the creditworthiness of a loan for investment. For example, it is
harder to obtain finance for investments in R&D-which is very human capital
intensive-compared to investment in tangible assets (Hall 2002). Overall, not
only are there differences in the level of financial development across countries,
but also different sectors are affected differently within the same country.
Table (1.1) lists a large number of countries who implemented far reach-
ing trade reforms during the 70’s, 80’s and early 90’s. The table lists the level
of private credit to GDP, a measure showing the amount of funds lent to the
firms by financial institutions as a fraction of GDP. The number corresponds
to the average value for the 3 years before and after the trade reform date3.
3Though the level of private credit to GDP varies yearly, I use an average over a number
of years which is a common practice in the literature. Moreover the series does not exhibit
before and after regime change expect for New Zealand during its trade reform. For Chile,
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This measure, though not perfect, is one of the widely used indexes of financial
development. For the topic of this paper, this measure is most relevant as it
directly addresses the external funds available to firms. There is significant
heterogeneity across the countries in Table (1.1) with regard to this measure.
While Spain has a level of private credit to GDP, similar to those of developed
countries such as France, few, such as New Zealand and Israel fall in the mid-
dle range, and most of the rest have low levels of private credit to GDP ratios
(under 30%).
While Latin American countries do not exhibit very high levels, among
them Bolivia and Mexico emerge as having very low levels of private credit
to GDP (15% and 13% respectively). On the other hand, Chile and Uruguay
have ratios almost twice as high (23% and 28%). As a simple comparison, it is
interesting to note the pattern of productivity growth in these four countries
after their trade reform. Edwards (1994) reports that in the late 70’s when
Chile’s reform had been completed, Chile experienced TFP growth three times
higher than its historical average. Uruguay though less spectacular, exhibited
significant improvements in TFP growth in the years following the trade re-
form. On the other hand, Bolivia shows a flat profile of TFP growth, and
Mexico even exhibits a slightly negative one, robust to different measures.
While this does not show causality, it is suggestive. To further explore
the level of private credit to GDP increases drastically but only 5 years after the reform
date.
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the relation of productivity growth and financial development in trade reforms,
I investigate the data more rigorously in next section using data on 16 trade
liberalization episodes.
1.2.3 Productivity Changes
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
provides data on the number of employees and value added for 28 industries
at 3-digit ISIC level, for a large number of countries4. Among those countries,
Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) argue there are 20 trade liberalization episodes.
They construct measures of trade liberalization based on not only the laws on
paper (de jure liberalization) but also based on the reaction of exports to the
laws on paper (de facto liberalization). They show in most cases the dates are
the same except for a couple of countries where the dates are at most one year
apart. Dates of liberalization in this paper is based on Wacziarg and Wallack
(2004). Among these liberalization episodes I consider those with available
data on value added and employment in UNIDO database for at least three
years before and after the trade reform in order to be able to compare the
differences. This reduces the number of trade reform episodes to 16 countries
which are denoted by an asterisk in Table (1.1).
I will compare the productivity growth of different sectors before and
after trade reform, and examine the relation of changes with the level of finan-
4The data is complied in one single database by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001) who provide
a detailed description of the dataset.
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cial development of the country. The dependent variable is the percent change
in productivity P tis of each sector s for each country i at any given year t. The
growth in productivity over τ years is denoted by
∆Pits(τ) = (P
t
is − P t−τis )/P t−τis
where τ = 2, 3 or 4. The basic regression takes the following form
∆Pits(τ) = α + β0Libit + β1Libit ∗ PCi + δi + δs + δt (1.1)
where ∆Pits(τ) is the productivity growth in sector s, country i at year t com-
pared with τ years earlier; δi, δs and δt are country, sector and time dummies,
Libit is a dummy which takes value 1 for all years after trade liberalization
and PCi is the measure of private development of country i namely the ra-
tio of private credit to GDP. While α, δi, δs and δt capture average effects
across industry, time, country, β0 captures the average change in productiv-
ity growth due to liberalization, and β1 captures whether country’s specific
financial features had an effect beyond the average effects of liberalizations.
A positive and significant β1 suggests trade liberalization promotes more pro-
ductivity improvement if it is happening in a country with better financial
intermediaries. In some versions of the regressions, δs and/or δc are replaced
by tδs and/or tδc to allow for specific sector and/or country trends that might
be going on as a global trend in a specific industry or country, regardless of
the liberalization.
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The response to trade liberalization can be slow and take years to ma-
terialize. Therefor the regressions are done for 2,3 or 4 year differences in
productivity growth. The results for one year productivity growth were mixed
and mostly not significant, however as I show the results for τ = 2, 3, 4 are all
significant in the direction that supports the hypothesis.
Table (1.1) lists the countries in the analysis and the values of private
credit to GDP ratios used in the analysis. Regression results for τ = 2, 3 and
4 year productivity growth are reported in Tables (1.3), (1.4) and (1.5).
The basic result is that coefficient β1 is positive and significant at %5
and in most of specifications at %1 level. First column of Table (1.3) reports
the basic treatment effect for trade liberalization on productivity growth. It
shows on average the (2 year) growth rate of productivity increases by %14
in the years after the trade reform. This is significant at %1 after controlling
for year, country and industry effects and specific country and industry trends
(columns 2 and 3 in the same table). Then I run the regression (1.1) to examine
whether the impact of trade liberalization varies across countries depending
on their financial development. Column 4 of Table (1.3) reports the results.
While average effect of trade reform, β0, is still significant, its magnitude and
significance is reduced, and financial development coefficient, β1 (significant at
%5), picks up the variations based on financial development. Overall, the effect
on a sector-country’s productivity growth compared to its normal growth rate
will be β0 + β1 ∗ PCi. For Mexico, this amounts to %10.6, (0.08 + 0.002*13)
13
while for Columbia this amounts to %14 (0.08+0.002*30). Tables (1.4) and
(1.5) report the effects on 3 and 4 year productivity growth. The effects die
out gradually to an average %5 and %3 average jump in productivity growth
for 3 and 4 year growth rates. However β1 remains significant at %1 level for
all of the specifications and the fit of regression improves (R2 increases).
There are some issues regarding the identification of coefficient β1. One
issue is that it is possible that β1 is not picking up the effect of financial de-
velopment but rather the overall development of a country. This is an issue
since financial development and GDP per capita are highly correlated. To
address this issue, I control for interactions of Lib dummy with the overall
development of the country proxied by GDP per capita. I also instrument for
financial development by the use of legal origin and legal effectiveness, instru-
ments that are correlated with financial development but not the productivity
growth (Beck (2003), La Porta (1999)). In all cases, the effect of financial
coefficient remains significant. Another issue is the measure of productivity
growth. Sectoral productivity growth may not only come from upgrade and
innovation, but also might be the result of movement of production (and labor)
to more productive firms within the same sector. In more developed countries,
there is fewer distortions in the overall economy and this is favorable for trade
reforms. For example lower labor market frictions facilitate the faster move-
ment of labor towards productive firms after a trade reform. In data, this
will be observed as an increased productivity (due to movement of labor and
production from less to more productive firms within a sector), however this
14
productivity growth may not be related to productivity upgrade and ease of
financing. My measure of productivity, P ts , is a crude one at aggregate sector
level, defined as the ratio of value added to total employment in each sector5.
The ideal measure of sectoral productivity should also account for the distri-
bution of production within a sector through assigning proper weights to value
added of different production units within a sector. However the two measures
conceptually are correlated and since we are interested about the changes in
P ts and not the levels per se, the lack of ideal measure of sectoral productivity
is less relevant. To further address this concern, I divide the sectors to two
groups based on their need to external finance. Rajan and Zingales (1999) de-
velop a proxy for external finance dependence of sectors which has been widely
used in the literature since. If financial development is important for financing
the needs to buy new technologies and upgrade productivity, then its effect on
productivity should be more pronounced in the sectors which are more depen-
dent on external finance. Table (1.2) lists the list of 3 digit ISIC sectors and
the corresponding level of external finance dependence index. I run the basic
regression (1.1) for two subsamples of sectors falling above and below the me-
dian level of external finance dependence index. The results of the regression
are reported in Table (1.6). It further strengthens the case. The sectors highly
dependent on external finance exhibit larger and more significant coefficients
for the effect of financial development on productivity growth.
5An alternative measure, productivity defined as value added of the sector divided by
the number of plants in the sector was not feasible due to the very incomplete data on the
number of plants in UNIDO.
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The empirical evidence presented so far, suggests the importance of
financial development for facilitating of productivity growth when countries
open up.
There still might be some issues. Trade reforms in different countries
vary significantly in terms of length and depth of reform. Moreover it can
be said that in some cases the small response of productivity growth to trade
openness could be due to low level of distortions before the trade reform. In
such a case, after the trade opening there will not be a strong response, no
matter what is the level of financial development. Due to small nature of
the dataset, it is not possible to control for, identify and isolate all of these
effects. To further explore this and better quantify the welfare effects, in the
rest of the paper I construct a structural model of small open economy with
heterogeneous firms. I calibrate the model to a low financially developed Latin
American country before its trade reform and quantify the gains from trade
reform if the country had better financial intermediaries.
1.3 Model Set Up
I build a model of an small open economy, with differentiated goods,
tariffs and financial frictions in obtaining productivity enhancing expenses. It
is an small economy model as studied in Kambourov (2008), and is augmented
by the possibility of drawing new productivity draws as in Costantini and
Melitz(2007).
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Preferences. The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals with












where ci is the consumption of good produced in sector i, and σ = 1/(1−ρ) >
1 is the constant elasticity of substitution. Standard arguments show that
domestic demand, ydi , for good i, is determined by the total income in the



















Firms and Technology. The economy consists of a continuum of sectors
each producing a good that is part of the composite good c̃ defined in (1.3).
All goods are tradable and each good i faces a world price pwi at which, foreign
firms stand ready to supply any desired quantity. Sectors are heterogeneous
with respect to the productivity and the world price of their product. Output
in each sector is produced according to the production function
ysi = zil
α
i , 0 < α < 1 (1.6)
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where zi is an idiosyncratic productivity specific to sector i, and li is the
number of labor units employed in that sector. I assume that for each good i,
there is one incumbent firm in sector i producing that good, and setting price
pi
6. Since the only difference between the goods is the productivity of their
respective firm, I use the terms good i and firm i interchangeably. Each period,
each firm hires labor at the market wage rate w, and produces according to
(1.6). A fraction of output is paid as wages to labor, while the rest is the
firm’s profit. The firm decides how to allocate this part between dividends
to shareholders or keeping it as retained profits for the purposes that will be
explained shortly. I assume all individuals hold the same portfolio of shares in
the firms, so the dividends across all sectors are aggregated and redistributed
to individuals as dividend income D. The firm has a static and a dynamic
problem. First the static problem is described.
Firm’s static problem. Within each period, the firm with productivity z,
takes the aggregates of the economy, price index P and the wage rate w as
given and decides about the price pi , the price of good i at home country,
and the amount of labor to hire. The world price pwi implies that pi can not
6This is similar to monopolistic competition where each firm is the single producer of
its differentiated good. However in my setup, each differentiated good is also produced
by foreign counterparts thus each firm in home country has lower market power due to
competition from abroad for the same exact good. The non-existence of competition at
home for the same exact good can happen where each home firm has a patent on production
of its good. Another case can be when new entrants for each sector/good pay fixed costs of
entry and setting up distribution networks, and that makes expected profits from a Cournot
competition with an incumbent so low that prevents entry altogether. This is similar to
Ericson and Pakes (1995) where there exist equlibria that with no entry and the incumbent
firm never exits.
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be more than pwi (1 + τ) or else home consumers will buy from foreign firms.
Moreover pi can not be less than p
w
i since it is not profitable for the firm i as it
can sell its output abroad at pwi . Firm i can however, sell at price pi at home




d + pwi y
x − wli (1.7)











pwi ≤ pi ≤ pwi (1 + τ)
The solution to this problem is given by a cut-off rule (see Figure (1.1)).
Firms with low productivity z, set higher prices and serve the home market,
while firms with higher productivity set lower prices and export as well, specif-
ically for each P and w there are cut-off points z and z such that
• If zi ≤ z, then pi = pwi (1 + τ) and firm i only serves home market
• If z < zi ≤ z, then pwi ≤ pi < pwi (1 + τ) . Serves all the demand of
home market and possibly exports some
• If z < zi, pi = pwi serves full demand of home market and exports.
This concludes the firms’s static problem.
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Evolution of Productivity and Firm Dynamic Problem Firm i’s pro-
ductivity evolves according to a known distribution z′ ∼ F (z)7. Moreover
each firm has a one time opportunity to pay a sunk cost SI to draw another
productivity draw from a more favorable distribution z′ ∼ G(z). This is sim-
ilar to Costaninit and Melitz (2007) set-up. Thus in each period, firms are
divided into the ones who have already innovated and those who have not
and will consider this decision. Note that each firm can only innovate once
and after the innovation jump the future productivity evolves according to the
same distribution z′ ∼ F (z).
Financial Frictions and Productivity Evolution. I assume that firms
need to finance the innovation cost, SI up-front, either by internal funds or
by borrowing from financial intermediaries. This is in contrast with the
benchmark models of heterogeneous firms, where firms can fully smooth the
operative, fixed and sunk costs across time through financial intermediaries.
The friction in this model arises from limited enforcement of debt contracts.
I assume there are frictions which prohibit the perfect enforcement of debt
contracts, in particular a firm can default on its debt and in case of default
the lenders can only recoup their loss by confiscating a fraction γ of firm’s
profits each period. Differences in the value of γ represent the differences in
the level of enforcement. In equilibrium, the optimal level of debt for each
firm would be such that the firm has no incentive to default. The value of
7This can be a degenerated distribution implying constant productivity. In the calibra-
tion section, the choice of F (z) will be explained.
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γ affects the level of debt that the lenders are willing to lend to a firm. For
example, γ = 1 means the firm loses all of its future profits in the case of
default. This implies the lenders will be willing to lend up to the value of firm
and still see no default. On the other extreme, γ = 0 is a case where firm sees
no punishment if it defaults, and of course in equilibrium, no lender will lend
to the firm and the level of debt would be zero. In the latter case, the firm
has to rely on its own internal funds in order to finance the costs of innovation.
This slows down the process of innovation as the firms have to save in order to
accumulate enough funds to innovate. Moreover lower dividends, lowers the
available income by consumers and adversely affects the profits of the firms
and consequently slows down the accumulation of internal funds even further.
I assume there are financial intermediaries who lend and accept deposits
at rate r. Firms dynamic problem involves whether to innovate in any specific
period if they have not done so already, and if yes, how to finance the costs.
Firm has the option to borrow subject to the enforcement contracts and can
also finance part of the costs through its own savings. The savings are the
retained profits of the firm which have been deposited at rate r.
Each firm discounts future at rate β and dies with per period probability
φ. Let i ∈ {0, 1} denote whether firm has innovated or not. and let d denote
the level of debt or saving of the firm (d > 0 denotes saving and d < 0 denotes
debt). Firm’s recursive problem for those who have already innovated is
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V (z, 1, d) = max
d′
Π(z;P ) + (1 + r)d− d′ + (1− φ)βEV (z′, 1, d′) (1.8)
st. Π(z;P ) + (1 + r)d− d′ ≥ 0 (dividend condition)
EV (z′, 1, d′) ≥ (1− γ)EV (z′, 1, 0) (no default condition)
The dividend conditions means that firms can not issue new shares. I assume
they should pass a non-negative dividend D(z, i, d) = Π(z;P ) + (1 + r)d− d′
to the shareholders. In the no default condition, the left hand side represents
the value of not defaulting and the right hand side the value of defaulting in
which case only fraction 1−γ of each period’s profit is left for the firm and the
rest is confiscated by the lenders. The firm’s problem in this case is simpler
and reduces to smoothing the debt over time subject to no default.
If a firm has not innovated yet, its recursive problem is characterized by
V (z, 0, d) = max
d′,I∈{0,1}
Π(z;P ) + (1 + r)d− d′ − I × SI + (1− φ)βEV (z′, I, d′)
(1.9)
st. Π(z;P ) + (1 + r)d− d′ − I × SI ≥ 0 (dividend condition)
EV (z′, I, d′) ≥ (1− γ)EV (z′, I, 0) (no default condition)
This completes the description of firm dynamic problem.
Entrants At the beginning of each period, death shocks are realized. Contin-
uing firms optimize based on (1.8) and (1.9). New entrants can pay sunk cost
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SE and draw a productivity from a known distribution H(z) and start off as
firms that have not innovated yet. Expected value of entry is
V E =
∫
V (z, 0, 0)h(z)dz − SE
which should be non negative in equilibrium to allow for entry of a positive
measure of firms. In equilibrium the number of entrants should be such to
replace the measure of dead firms, leading to a constant measure of firms.
The nature of firms entry cost and dividend payment rules imply that




D(z, i, d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
dividend
− E × SE
Distribution of firms. Given the death of some of firms and the initial
distribution of entrants, the distribution of firms is determined by the firms’
decisions (innovate or not) , level of debt or saving, and the stochastic evolution
of firms’ productivities. Starting with distribution of firms Mt−1(z, i, d), at the
beginning of period t, death shocks are realized. The firms’ policy decisions
and the evolution of productivities lead to the distribution of continuing firms,
MCt (z, i, d). The incumbent firms together with the new entrants, distributed
as Et(z, 0, 0) constitute the firm distribution
Mt(z, i, d) = M
C(z, i, d) + E(z, 0, 0)
Equilibrium. An stationary equilibrium is characterized by stable aggregate
values for P, Y, w, r. The equilibrium conditions are related to the firms’ and
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consumer’s optimal decision, value of entry and full use of resources. The
stationary equilibrium is characterized by
• Aggregate s P, Y and prices w, r, pwi
• Firm’s Value Function V (z, i, d), Innovation Policy Function I(z, 0, d)
and debt Function d(z, i, d) satisfying (1.7),(1.8) and (1.9).
• Distribution of firms M(z, i, d)
• Distribution of new entrants E(z, 0, 0)
• Distribution of firms is consistent with firm decisions and entrants dis-
tribution
• Aggregates P and Y are consistent with firm decisions and all resources
are used.
Some aspects of the equilibrium are worth noting. In equilibrium pos-
itive entry is needed to counterbalance the death of firms. The value of entry
should be non negative to allow for entry. A positive value of entry leads to
entry of too many firms, therefore in equilibrium the value of entry should
be exactly zero, and the measure of entering firms should be exactly equal to
those who exit due to death shock.
There is not an ordering of firms based on productivity. Even though
more productive firms are more likely to innovate, innovation also depends
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on the level of savings. Two firms with the same level of productivity might
make different innovation decision due to their different level of savings which
translates to different abilities of financing the costs of innovation. This is
in contrast with the frictionless scenario where the only variable affecting the
innovation decision is the current productivity of the firm.
Financial frictions affect the aggregate productivity and output in a
couple of different ways. First, as explained some firms are prohibited from
productivity improvement due to lack of funds even though they could have
done it profitably in a frictionless economy Second, firms who need to inno-
vate might have to also finance part of the innovation costs internally. This
diverts some funds from dividends to savings and lowers the total income of
the consumers. This in turn lowers the demand, profitability and value of
the firms and makes their constraints tighter, requiring more savings. This
is the indirect income effect adversely affecting the innovation in presence of
frictions.
To explore the numerical implications of the model, a computational
method for finding the stationary equilibrium is developed as described in the




To study the effects of financial frictions on output and productivity
when a country implements trade reforms, I consider the case of Mexico after
its trade reform of 1986. Mexico, had a very low level of private credit to
GDP of %13 during these period until 1990. The pattern of FDI inflows
and stock market capitalization during the reform years until 1995 shows that
during this time the way firms usually obtain access to funds and technology
have not changed much. FDI inflows almost grow at the same rate as before
and ratio of FDI/GDP remains around %1 well until 1995 at which time
it drastically increases to %3. The absolute value of FDI flows in 1995 and
following years is around 3-4 times the value of FDI inflows in years before and
after 1986. During first years of reform Stock market capitalization remains
at around %12 until 1993 and then starts growing faster (compare this to the
%30 ratio for Chile at 1986). I conclude that Mexico at the time of its trade
reform in 1986 emerges as a country with limited financial resources available
to its firms.
I calibrate the parameters of the model to the specifics of Mexican
economy in the 1986 as a distorted economy with high tariffs and low level of
financial development. Then I study the economy under two scenarios. First,
the tariffs are reduced but the level of financial development is the same. In
second scenario, the tariffs are reduced and the financial frictions are removed
as well. In both scenarios I solve for the stationary equilibrium and compare
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the levels of output and welfare. The difference between the two scenarios
quantifies the effects of financial frictions.
Choice of parameters and Results. Tables (1.8) and (1.9) summarize the
choice of parameters. Some parameters are chosen according to the common
choices in the literature or to reflect empirical findings on firm dynamics across
countries. I chose β = 0.95 to reflect an annual interest rate of %5. The
elasticity of substitution is set at σ = 2.5 which implies ρ =0.6.The share of
labor in output is set to α = 0.6. The death shock is set at φ = %10 according
to Bartelsman (2003).
The choice of evolution of productivities for continuing, innovating and
entrants is chosen based on the analysis of firm dynamics by Costantini and
Melitz (2007). I assume that for continuing firms that have not innovated the
evolution of productivity is log-normally distributed around the current pe-
riod’s productivity , i.e. log(z′) is normal with mean of log(z) and standard
deviation of %2 (with truncation of extreme ends to avoid accumulation of
firms at the end of grid points). While it is not necessary for the qualitative
analysis that z′|F (z) be a non-degenerated distribution, it makes the comput-
ing of firms distribution and decisions easier by allowing for smoother transi-
tions across innovation states and smoother distributions and value functions8.
8It can also be argued that in reality existence of uncertainty induces some inaction in
firm’s innovation decisions. This is on top of the inaction due to financial friction. Using
relevant data moments one could isolate and identify each of these effects. This is not the
route taken in this paper though.
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The effect of innovation is assumed to be a %10 increase in productivity on
average, in the sense that for innovating firms log(z′) is distributed normally
with mean log(1.1z) and standard deviation of %2 (with truncated extremes).
Finally The entrants are log-normally distributed on the lower end of the grid.
The rest of parameters w, pw, γ, SI and SE are chosen by solving the
model and matching certain moments. First w is normalized to one. While
pw, γ, SI and SE jointly affect the economy outcomes, some are more directly
related to a certain moment than others. The world price pw, affects the com-
parative advantage of the economy and thus the ratio of exports to GDP. The
parameter γ, summarizing level of financial development affects the tightness
of borrowing (and default) constraints and the level of debt, private credit to
GDP. The magnitude of sunk cost of innovation affects the chances of pro-
ductivity improvement, and thus indirectly affects the chances of becoming an
exporter and the number of exporting firms. The level of sunk costs of entry
SI is chosen relative to the sunk cost of innovation similar to Costantini &
Melitz (2007).
The parameters of the model are then used to run two scenarios. Table
(1.10) summarizes the results of numerical exercises. Second and third columns
show the real output, productivity and welfare compared to the normalized
case of Mexico before trade reform (first column). The first column is an
economy with high tariff rates and low level of financial development such
as Mexico in 1986. The second column corresponds to the new stationary
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equilibrium for the same economy when the tariff rates are reduced but the
level of financial development has remained the same. The third column is
the stationary equilibrium of a counter-factual scenario, where the tariffs have
been reduced to %15 and the financial frictions has been eliminated.
Table (1.10) reports the results. First of all, removing both tariffs
and financial frictions, improves output, welfare and productivity significantly.
Comparing columns (2) and (3) show that if financial frictions persist after
the trade reform as much as %40 of gains in terms of output, welfare and
productivity is lost. This is quantitatively very large and underlines the
importance of better financial intermediaries at the outset of trade reforms.
1.5 Conclusion
The paper argues that productivity improvement is an important goal
intended by trade reforms, and therefore it is important to document and quan-
tify the effects of impediment to productivity growth in the trade reforms. The
paper does so by providing empirical evidence of the importance of financial
development in the productivity growth after trade reforms. The quanti-
tative exercises show that the lost gains from underdevelopment of financial
intermediaries, can be significant in terms of welfare, output and productivity.
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Figure 1.1: Price function
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Figure 1.2: Policy function I(z, 0, d)
31
1.6 Appendix: Computational Algorithm
• Set parameters
• Guess P, Y
• Solve for firm’s static production and profit functions
• Guess and Repeat dynamic policy and value functions until convergent
• Solve for distribution of firms
• Update P, Y
• Repeat until convergence
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Table 1.1: List of Countries in the Analysis of Chapter 1
De facto year Years available in UNIDO Private Credit/GDP
of Liberalization
Argentina 1976 1984-90, 93-98
Bolivia* 1986 1976-2000 15
Chile 1976 1976-2000 23
Colombia* 1991 1976-2000 30
Ecuador* 1991 1984-2002 16
Ghana* 1985 1976-1987, 1993-1995 3
Guatemala 1989 1976-1988, 1991-1995
Hungary* 1993 1976-2000 25
India* 1994 1976-2001 23
Israel* 1987 1976-1996 57
Kenya* 1993 1976-2002 31
Mexico* 1987 1976-2000 13
Morocco 1987 1976-1980, 1987-2002
New Zealand 1987 1976-1991 55
Phillippines* 1988 1976-1997 21
Poland* 1990 1976-1993 22
Spain* 1979 1976-2000 75
Sri Lanka* 1991 1979-1983, 1987-2000 9
Turkey* 1990 1976-2000 13
Uruguay* 1990 1976-2000 28
Notes. Dates of liberalization are from Wacziarg and Wallack (2004).
Private Credit to GDP data is from WDI database and is averaged for 3 years before .
and after trade reform dates. The pattern of that series does not change during this
time interval except for New Zealand.
33
Table 1.2: External Finance Dependence Index
ISIC codes ISIC 2 description External Finance Dependence




322 Apparel, except footware 0.0286
323 Leather and its products and substitutes except footware and apparel -0.1400
324 Manufacture of footware, except rubber or plastic -0.1400
331 Wood products except furniture -0.0779
332 Furniture except metal 0.2840
341 Paper and paper products 0.2357
342 Printing and publishing 0.1756
351 Industrial chemicals 0.2038
352 Other chemicals 0.2187
353 Petrolum refineries 0.0420
354 Misc. products of petrolum and coal 0.3341
355 Rubber products 0.2265
356 Plastic products n.e.c. 1.1401
361 Pottery, china and earthenware -0.1459
362 Glass and glass products 0.5285
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.0620
371 Iron and steel industries 0.0871
372 Non-ferrous metal industries 0.0055
381 Fabricated metal product, except machinery and equipment 0.2371
382 Machinery except electrical 0.4453
383 Electrical machinery 0.7675
384 Transport equipment 0.3069
385 Professional and scientific 0.9610
390 Other manufacturing 0.4702
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Table 1.3: Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth in 2 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COEFFICIENT
Lib 0.1398*** 0.1399*** 0.1399*** 0.0749** 0.0750** 0.0750**
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0371)
Lib* Private Credit 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y N Y Y N
Country dummies Y N N Y N N
Industry-specific trends N N Y N N Y
Country-specific trends N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 4277 4277 4277 4277 4277 4277
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.119 0.119 0.119
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Note. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all years after trade reform.
Regression specification :
∆P its(τ) = α+ β0Libit+β1Libit∗PCi+δi+δs+δt
Table 1.4: Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth in 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COEFFICIENT All Country Country All Country Country
dummies Trend & Industry dummies Trend & Industry
Trends Trends
Lib 0.0636** 0.0636** 0.0636** -0.0956** -0.0956** -0.0956**
(0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0422) (0.0422) (0.0422)
Lib*Private Credit 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y N Y Y N
Country dummies Y N N Y N N
Industry-specific trends N N Y N N Y
Country-specific trends N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 4111 4111 4111 4111 4111 4111
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.166 0.166 0.166
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Note. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all years after trade reform.
Regression specification :
∆P its(τ) = α+ β0Libit+β1Libit∗PCi+δi+δs+δt
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Table 1.5: Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth in 4 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COEFFICIENT All Country Country All Country Country
dummies Trend & Industry dummies Trend & Industry
Trends Trends
Lib 0.0262 0.0392 0.0392 -0.1852*** -0.1853*** -0.1853***
(0.0351) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0541) (0.0541) (0.0541)
LibPC3 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0094***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y N Y Y N
Country dummies Y N N Y N N
Industry-specific trends N N Y N N Y
Country-specific trends N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 4137 4174 4174 4174 4174 4174
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.176 0.176 0.184 0.184 0.184
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Note. Lib is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all years after trade reform.
Regression specification :
∆P its(τ) = α+ β0Libit+β1Libit∗PCi+δi+δs+δt
Table 1.6: Trade Reform and Sectoral Productivity Improvemen, Different
sectoral reactions based on External Finance Dependence
(1) (2)
COEFFICIENT High Exf Low Exf
Lib 0.0521* 0.0946*
(0.0235) (0.0551)
Lib* Private Credit 0.0040*** 0.0018
(0.0014) (0.0015)
Year dummies Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y
Country dummies Y Y
Observations 2152 2125
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.092
Standard errors in parentheses *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Regression Specification:.
∆P its(τ) = α + β0Libit+β1Libit∗PCi+δi+δs+δt
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Lib*Private Credit 0.0025* 0.0025*
(0.0014) (0.0015)
Observations 2129 2160
Year dummies Y Y
Country dummies Y Y
Industry dummies Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.102
Standard errors in parentheses *** , ** and * denote significance at 1,5 and 10 percent.
CV= 1 indicates sectors that have a comparative advantage (according to Balassa Index)
in the corresponding country in the year of liberalization.
Regression specification:
∆P its(τ) = α+ β0Libit+β1Libit∗PCi+δi+δs+δt
Table 1.8: Choice of Parameters, Case of Mexico
Parameter Description Comment
β = 0.95 %5 annual interest rate
ρ = 0.6 such that elasticity of substitution σ =2.5
φ = 0.10 Probability of exogenous death shock at plant level Bartelsman(2003)
z′|F (z) productivity transition log normal with mean z, std 0.02 Costantini Melitz (2007)
z′|F (z) transition at innovation log normal with mean 1.1z and std 0.02 Costantini Melitz (2007)
G(z) new entrants lognormal distributed on lower end of the grid Costantini Melitz (2007)
τ = %60 Average tariffs before trade reform IADB(1997)
Table 1.9: Choice of Parameters by Solving the Model, Case of Mexico
Parameter Description Target Data
w = 1 Normalization
pw Affects comparative advantage Export/GDP = %16
γ Level of financial development Credit/GDP= %13
SI Sunk cost of investment %10 of firms export IADB(1997)
SE Sunk cost of entry s.t. SI/SE = 5 Costantini Melitz(08)
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Table 1.10: Numerical Exercise, Case of Mexico
Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3 Economy 4
τ = %60 τ = %15 τ = %15 τ = %60
Low Fin. Dev Low Fin. Dev. High Fin. Dev. High Fin. Dev.
Real output 100 105 109 104
Productivity 100 106 110 106
Welfare 100 106 110 105
Export/Output %16 %25 %30 %23
Table 1.11: Choice of Parameters by Solving the Model, Case of Average
Country (Mexico, Bolivia, Chile)
Parameter Description Target Data
w = 1 Normalization
pw Affects comparative advantage Export/GDP = %20
γ Level of financial development Credit/GDP= %18
SI Sunk cost of investment %20 of firms export IADB(1997)
SE Sunk cost of entry s.t. SI/SE = 5 Costantini Melitz(08)
Table 1.12: Numerical Exercise, Case of Average Country (Mexico, Columbia,
Bolivia)
Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3
τ = %42 τ = %15 τ = %15
Low Fin. Dev Low Fin. Dev. High Fin. Dev.
Real output 100 104 107
Productivity 100 105 106
Welfare 100 105 106
Export/Output %20 %25 %30
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Chapter 2
Firm Size Distribution, Trade Openness and
Financial Development: an Empirical Analysis
2.1 Introduction
There is a large and growing literature on the ways that international
trade affects firms decisions and distribution. This literature emphasizes that
competitive pressure resulting from low tariffs induces larger and/or more
productive firms to grow to export markets and at the same time, smaller
and/or less productive firms are induced to exit or shrinkage.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing new empirical
evidence that openness pressure affects larger and smaller firms differently
and this effects are magnified in the presence of financial frictions. While
most of the empirical literature on effects of trade on firms’ decision, tend
to focus on firm level databases within a country, this paper makes use of
comparable cross-country data on firm size distribution and firm decision.
Thereby providing evidence that the aforementioned asymmetric effects hold
true in cross-country comparison as well.
The basic idea is that the level of trade protection in a country affects
the level of competitive pressure the firms are facing. Low levels of tariffs,
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increase the pressure from foreign competitors thus increase the incentives
to become more efficient. Larger firms are likely to grow to export markets,
while smaller firms are likely to lose business unless they improve their effi-
ciency. Financial frictions, however, limit the ability of firms to upgrade their
technology, and this is more hindering for smaller firms. This asymmetric ef-
fect motivates the hypothesis of this paper. The paper hypothesizes that lower
levels of trade protection along with lower levels of financial development leads
to bigger disparity in firm size distribution. This is the first hypothesis that
the paper tests.
At the firm level, the same theoretical argument would lead one to
expect that larger firms in countries with lower trade protection and lower
financial development tend to have an advantage in upgrading their technolo-
gies compared to their smaller compatriots. I use a comparable cross-country
dataset by World Bank, which provides firm level information on technology
upgrading of firms. I provide further evidence that financial development af-
fects firms decisions in an asymmetric manner. This is the second hypothesis
that the paper tests.
The paper uses two cross-country databases and two tests to provide
evidence for the within industry effects of trade and financial development.
This topic is important for several reasons. First, many counties have pro-
grams to support small and medium size enterprises (SME) and spend large
sums of money to subsidize SMEs with the hope of promoting growth and
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employment. This paper does not have a view on success of such policies,
however it sheds light on the ways such policies, if deemed beneficial, could
be enhanced. Given that SMEs are most vulnerable in trade liberalizations,
the policies could give considerations to improving financial services in order
to facilitate technology upgrade by SMEs. Second, it shows financial develop-
ment has secondary impacts on composition of production and distribution of
resources, beyond its overall impact on growth.
This paper uses a double difference approach to test the two hypotheses
put forth above. First, Business Size Class data across OECD countries is used
which provides us with information on distribution of production units across
various sizes within each industry. Using this information, a summary-statistic
of firm size disparity within industries across countries is constructed. Double
difference regressions are used to test that for any level of trade openness, how
much financial restrictions add to the disparity in firm size distribution. Var-
ious controls are included to isolate the effect. Results are significant and are
not due to simultaneity or reserve causality. Second, we turn to a firm level
survey conducted by World Bank across a large number of developing coun-
tries. The advantage of this dataset is that it involves developing countries
and moreover it provide us with firms’ responses on their choice of technology
upgrade and a host of other firm characteristics. To determine the asymmetric
impact of trade openness and financial development on firms decision, a double
difference approach is employed to isolate the impact of trade openness, finan-
cial development and size. The results indicate as access to financial services
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improve, the probability of technology upgrade increases for all but more so
for smaller firms, and this effect is more pronounced the more trade is open.
The results contribute to different literatures. One is the literature
on determinants of firm growth and the role of financial development. This
literature examines the way financial development shapes the growth and
composition of industries. There is a large literature, starting with LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) that argues that a country’s le-
gal and financial systems is a significant determinant of the financing of firms.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) have
stressed the importance of the financial system and the rule of law for relaxing
firms’ external financing constraints and facilitating their growth. While the
firms in the same country, face similar institutions, constraints are felt harsher
by smaller firms due to a host of reasons, for example the smaller ability to
generate funds internally. This has been the focus of a theoretical and em-
pirical literature, for instance, Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Beck et al
(2005). While this literature, considers several macroeconomic factors in play,
such as the overall market size (GDP), it overlooks an important component
of the macroeconomic landscape, namely the level of openness to international
trade as a driving force in industry dynamics. This paper contributes to this
literature, by highlighting the international trade channel though which com-
petitive pressures affects firms incentives for growth/upgrade and financial
friction’s effects are felt by firms through this channel.
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The paper also relates to the literature on trade and finance. Among
others, several theoretical and empirical works by Kletzer and Bardhan (1987),
Freitas (2003) , Beck (2003, 2004) and Matsuyama (2005) have focused on es-
tablishing the links between financial development of a country and how it
shapes the patterns of exports and comparative advantage through affecting
different industries in different ways. Similarly this paper uses cross-country
data and benefits from cross-industry/cross-country differences for identifica-
tion, however it is different as it focuses on within industry effects such as the
size distribution within industry.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section, introduces the empiri-
cal strategy to test two hypothesis on the relative size of firms within industry,
as well as a test on upgrading decision of firms. Section III, discusses the first
test, data and results Section IV, discusses the second test, relevant data and
results. Section V offers some conclusions.
2.2 Firm Size Distribution
2.2.1 Empirical Strategy
Regarding the firm size distribution, the hypothesis is that high levels
of financial obstacles is conducive to larger disparity in firm size distribution
especially in industries with high trade openness-where firms are hard pressed
for technology upgrade. To capture the effect, a measure of disparity in firm
size distribution is every country-industry pair is regressed on the variables of
trade openness and financial obstacles. Since we are interested in how the effect
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of financial obstacles varies with trade openness, we allow the the coefficient
on financial obstacles vary with trade openness, i.e. the regression is on the
interaction of those two variables. The dataset includes ?Number of OECD
countries and ? Number of industries characterized by ISIS 3 digit.
The outcome variables are measures of relative size of firms in different
points of distribution. For example, P
95/25
ij is the ratio of the size of the firm in
the 95th percentile of the distribution to size of the firm in the 25th percentile
for industry i and country j. The set of regressions cover most of the firm
size distribution, with the extreme points avoided. Using the same notation,




ij = βTTOij ∗ FINOBSTi (2.1)










δkXi,k ∗ Yj,k + ειj
The subscribes i and j denote country and industry respectively. In
the first interaction term, TOij is a measure of trade openness in country i
and industry j. The measure will be the difference of number 100 and the
level of tariff in the relevant country-industry pair, where tariff is expressed in
percent points. The variable FINOBSTi is the measure of financial obstacles
in country i and is a country-level variable. To create a proxy for financial
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obstacles, we use the inverse of the level of private credit to GDP for country i.
Private credit to GDP is the most preferred measure of financial development
used in the literature, and will be so in this paper as well, however robustness
analysis with respect to our proxies of financial development will be conducted
as well. The regression also includes the interaction of FINOBSTi with two
other variables, namely EXTj and RDj. The industry level variable EXTj, is
a measure of dependence of firms within industry j on external finance, and
RDj is a proxy for intensity of R&D activity within industry j. The reason
to include these two interaction terms, is that they provide channels through
which firms could be affected asymmetrically. For example, in countries with
high financial obstacles and in industries with high dependence on external
finance for investment, larger firms might find it easier to obtain finance and
hence we might observe a more unequal distribution. For similar reasons,
the regression controls for interaction of several other industry and country
characteristics, Xi,k and Yj,k. They will be factor endowment of the country
and factor intensity of the industry. The idea is that in industries that make
use of a specific factor intensely, big firms will have a comparative advantage
compared to smaller firms when they are both competing for the same factor
in countries that are not abundant in a specific factor. Finally, ειij is the error
term.
The approach is a double difference approach that is commonly used
in literature. It was introduced in Rajan and Zingales (1998) to deal with
the endogeneity problem in cross country studies. Using the interactions, we
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analyze the differential impact of financial obstacles on various levels of trade
openness in industries. The framework, reduces the bias of omitted variables,
as it focuses on differential impacts rather than the direct levels. Once the
fixed industry and industry dummies are included, only control variables that
vary both with country and industry need be included. Since the specifica-
tion controls for country-specific effects and industry-specific effects, the only
effects that are identified are those relative to variables that vary both cross
countries and cross industries. The assumption that enables us to identify the
interaction effect is that the omitted variables are unlikely to be correlated
with the interaction of trade openness and financial development.
The coefficient of interest is βT . A significant and positive βT is what
our hypothesis leads us to expect. It will basically mean that controlling
for other country and industry level effects, for a level of trade openness, as
financial obstacles become tougher, disparity in firm size increases.
2.2.2 Data
This section describes the variables used in the analysis of firm size
distribution. These include measures of disparity of firm distribution within
each country-industry pair, industry level variables and country level variables.
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2.2.2.1 Dependent Variable: Measures of Disparity in Firm Size
Distribution
I construct measures of disparity in firm size distribution building up
from the industry level data provided in the Business Statistics by Size Class
(BSC) database compiled by OECD secretariat 1. This database provides in-
formation relating to business activities broken down by industrial sector and
size class. The industrial sector classification, is according to the International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Moreover, the informa-
tion is broken down into employment size classes. Employment size classes
comprise of five different size classes where the data across countries and vari-
ables can be most closely aligned. Each size class comprises of firms with sizes
within one of the following ranges 2:
1− 9, 10− 19, 20− 49, 50− 249, 250+
The database provides the number of enterprises and the number of
total employers for each ISIC3 code and each of the five aforementioned size
classes. Provided with the number of enterprises in each size class, a cumu-
lative distribution of number of firms according to size is constructed. This
1The BSC database is part of the larger Structural and Demographic Business Statistics
database by OECD.
2Not all countries report according to this size class category. Variations in cutoffs exist.
For example, US reports its data according to cutoffs 1−9, 10−19, 20−99, 100−499, 500+,
that is why BSC calls the categories National Size Classes: NSC1, ...NSC5. This is not
material to our purpose, as will be realized from the construction of our disparity measure.
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cumulative distribution is very crude in the sense that it is built over 5 size
classes, as such it does not allow for very precise measures of disparity in dis-
tribution. Therefore, I construct simple intuitive measures of disparity based
on relative size of firms in varying points of the distribution.
To better illustrate, suppose we would like to construct P 75/25 as the
ratio of the size of the firm in the 75th percentile of the distribution to the size
of the firm in the 25th percentile of the distribution for a given industry and
given country. Using the cumulative distribution, one can see that, say, 75th
percentile firm in industry code code, say 131, lies within which one of the size
bins. While we do not have the exact size of the 75th percentile firm, we will
use the average firm size in the corresponding bin as a proxy for the size of the
75th percentile firm. The same method is used to identify the bin in which the
25th percentile firm lies, then the average size of firms in that bin is used as a
proxy for the size of the 25th percentile firm. Having the two numbers, P 75/25
is obtained as the ratio of the size of the 75th percentile to 25th percentile
firm. This method is used to construct the relative size of firms across various
point in firms size distribution, namely P 95/25, P 95/50, P 95/75, P 75/50, P 75/25 and
P 50/25. Given the unrefined nature of the underlying firm distribution, the end
points are avoided.
BSC provides data for OECD countries from 1995-2003. However the
availability of data across years varies greatly across countries, with better
availability of data from 2000 onwards. We have chosen the data for year
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2001 as the basis of comparison, as it was the year that the largest number of
countries had provided the data. This leaves 24 countries in our database (see
table ? for a list of countries).
In terms of industries included in the analysis, 55 industries at 3 digit
level of ISIC rev.3 characterization are included. BSC provides data at the
2 digit and 4 digit levels as well. The reason to choose the 3 digit level is a
trade-off. On the one hand, it is desired to choose a level as refined as possible
to make use of the most available information. On the other hand, there was
a restriction by the coverage of tariff rates that were available only up to the
3 digit level. Those considerations resulted in focusing on the 3 digit level
refinement and forgo the finer 4 digit and rougher 2 digit.
For each of the 24 countries and 55 industries, the measures of disparity
in firm size were constructed. However not all of the country-industry pairs
had complete data on size classes to result in a observation on disparity.
2.2.2.2 Measures of Trade Openness
Tariffs are a simple and widely available measure of trade restrictive-
ness. Therefore to construct a measure of trade openness for each country-
industry pair, 100 minus level of tariffs in the respective country-industry pair
is used. The tariff data is taken from the Trade, Production and Protection
database (TPP), compiled by World Bank Trade group and described in Nicita
and Olarreaga (2006). Among other variables, the database provides measures
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of simple tariff, weighted tariff, and non-tariff barriers to trade for a large num-
ber of developed and developing countries and for 28 manufacturing sectoring
corresponding to the 3-digit ISIC, revision 2. The database covers potentially
100 countries for 1974-2004 however coverage varies greatly across countries
and years.
Tariff data are provided according to ISIC revision 2 in the TPP database.
Since the BSC data, the basis of our disparity measures are based on 3rd revi-
sion of ISIC, conversion tables provided by UN are used for matching of ISIC
3 to ISIC 2 codes.
TPP database provides three measures of trade barriers. Simple av-
erage tariff, weighted average tariff and a proxy for non-tariff-barriers. The
analysis in this paper, makes use of the simple average tariff. For robustness
analysis, weighted average tariffs are also used, however non-tariff-barriers
have not been used due to its poor availability in TPP database. In particular
the coverage is very poor for the year 2001. In TPP database, Simple Applied
Tariff represents the simple average applied tariff rate applied on goods enter-
ing the country. Applied rates take into consideration the available (however,
not complete) data for preferential schemes (i.e. the applied average tariff
takes the tariff rates for each partner that export to the market country in
constructing the average). Applied Tariff is reported in percentage points.
Weighted applied tariff is similarly defined however it is defined as import
weighted average applied tariff rate applied on goods entering the country.
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Simple and weighted tariff are highly correlated and also correlated
with tariff in the previous years, see Table ? . In addition to simple and
weighted tariff, an average of tariff for the lagged years is used in the analysis.
The reason to use lagged tariff is that outcome variables observed in each year
are the result of trade policies in the previous year, therefore one should not
only focus on contemporaneous policy variables. The results reported in this
paper, make use of the average simple tariff rates for the recent three years for
every point in time.
2.2.2.3 Industry Level Measures: External Dependence, R&D and
Resource Intensity
The measure for external dependence on finance, an industry variable,
is taken from Beck (2003). This measure captures the extent of capital expen-
ditures in an industry that were funded externally, i.e. not with internal funds,
to the total capital expenditure. This measure is very common in the literature
since Rajan and Zingales (1998), and is generally constructed using data on
US firms over a 10 year average. The underlying assumption is that the extent
of dependence on external finance is a technological matter and depends on
the characteristics of the industry such as the size of the fixed costs, the lag
between investment and profit materialization (which will require financing)
and similar considerations. The measure is constructed using Compustat data
on US firms. The reason for using US firms is that US is considered to be
the most friction free economic environment and therefore therefore once the
measure is computed for US firms it reflects mostly the characteristics of the
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industry and not so much the restrictions of the economic environment.
The measure for intensity of R& D in industry level, is taken from
Freitas (2004). The measure reflects the intensity of R& D activity taken
within industry and is constructed using Compustat data on US firms, as the
average of the ratio of the R& D expenditure to book value of the firms within
and industry.
Several other industry level variables enter regression equation (1) in
the interaction terms denoted by
∑
k δkXi,k ∗ Yj,k. These additional industry
level variables, Yj,k, are measures of resource intensity of the corresponding
intensity, i.e. natural resource intensity, human capital intensity and capital
intensity. Similar to measures of external dependence and R & D intensity,
these measures are assumed to be inherent characteristics of various industries.
For example, wood industries and petroleum industries have a high level of
dependence on natural resources. These variables are included in the regres-
sion, in the interaction terms with the resource abundance in the country. To
construct these measures, similar to the literature, e.g Freitas (2004), I have
used the data for US firms over a ten year period of 1992-2001. Natural re-
source intensity is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for industries that
are considered resource intensive including wood products, paper and prod-
ucts, petroleum refineries, miscellaneous petroleum and coal products, other
nonmetallic mineral products, iron and steel and non-ferrous metals. Invest-
ment intensity is constructed as the median of the ratio of gross fixed capital
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performance to value added among US firms over the period 1992-2001. The
index for human capital intensity is the industry’s mean wage over that of the
whole manufacturing sector in the US. The required data to construct these
variables is available in TPP database as well.
2.2.2.4 Country Level Measures: Financial Obstacles and Resource
Endowments
The indicator on Financial Obstacles intends to capture the extent of
financial obstacles faced by the firms. Equivalently, we make use of the inverse
of an indicator used to capture the amount of financing available to the firms.
This indicator, Private Credit to GDP, is a very common measure of financial
development, and is defined as the amount of credit offered to firms by financial
intermediaries divided by GDP. We will use inverse of this measure throughout
the paper as the main measure of financial obstacles faced by firms.
Several other measures of financial development are common in the
literature as well, such as market capitalization, which is defined by the size of
stock market divided by GDP. As a robustness check, we will make use of this
measure as well. However such measures, which depend on the stock market,
do not directly capture the amount of funds available to firms, especially since
stock prices reflect expectations about future growth and profitability.
Other country level variables that appear in regression (1) as in inter-
action terms
∑
k δkXi,k ∗ Yj,k are measures of resource abundance at country
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level. They include measures on factor endowment such as physical capital,
human resource capital and natural resource capital. These measures are ob-
tained from various sources. The measure of human capital endowment in
a country is proxied by the average schooling, obtained from Barro and Lee
(2000) database. The most up to date cross-country data is available for year
2000 and not 2001, however we notice that schooling varies extremely slowly
and it is unlikely that using schooling as of year 2000 instead of 2001 will affect
the analysis. The level of physical capital endowment, proxied by the level of
physical capital per worker is taken from Penn World Tables. The endowment
in natural resource are obtained from World Bank’s Expanding the Measure
of Wealth Database.
2.2.3 Results
The result of the basic regression (1) are reported in Table (2.4). The
dependent variable are relative size of large to small firms in various points of
the distribution. Our hypothesis expects us to see the coefficient on interaction
of Trade Openness and Financial Obstacles to be positive and significant. As
Table (2.4) shows this coefficient is positive and significant for three out of six
of the disparity measures. The measures for which we do not see a significant
coefficient are P 95/75, P 75/50 and P 50/25. These three ratios, compare the size
of firms which are in various percentiles of the firm size distribution that are
close to each other compared to the three other measures with significant
coefficients. One reason to explain why the coefficients on these measures
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are not significant, is that given that our firm size distribution is very crude.
Basically, the firms in each industry have been grouped in 5 bins, therefore
it very often happens that firms in say, 95th percentile and 75th percentile
happen to be in the same bin, therefore for the corresponding industry P 95/75
will be equal to one. Therefore when comparing the size of firms in close
percentiles, P 95/75 does not provide enough variation at all, and therefore we
do not see any significant coefficient.
Ratios of firms in other points in firm size distribution have been used
in the regression, such as P 98/95, P 80/75, P 80/20, and so on. The results are not
reported in Table (2.4), but show a very similar pattern. For ratios such as
P 98/95, P 80/75 we do not see much variation in the dependent variable and the
coefficients are not significant, however for ratios on far-enough points of the
distribution such as P 80/20 and P 70/20, the coefficients on the main interaction
term are significant at at least 10 percent.
The two industry characteristics interaction with Financial Obstacles,
namely External Dependence and R&D intensity do not appear significant in
any of the regressions.
There are three interaction terms involving factor endowments out of
which only the human capital factor appears to have significant second order
effects. In all the regressions where the main interaction terms is significant,
the human capital interaction also appears significant.
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All the regressions include instrumental variables to control for reverse
causality and simultaneity. The concern about reverse causality is that, it
might be argued that instead of Financial Obstacles affecting disparity, it is
disparity that is driving financial underdevelopment. It could be the case
that, for example, in cases of extreme disparity in firm size, banks do not
have incentive to improve their financial services to service smaller firms. To
control for reverse causality and simultaneity, we instrument financial develop-
ment/obstacles with Legal Origin. Countries in our sample have either British,
French, German or Scandinavian legal origin (data is from La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999)). Previous research has shown that the
legal origin of a country influences its legal treatment of creditors and share-
holders, its accounting standards and the efficiency of contract enforcement,
and thus the quality of its financial services. While we cannot reject the possi-
bility that there is a link from the structure of firm distribution to the financial
sector, using the legal origin to extract the exogenous component of financial
development allows us to conclude that the positive relationship is not merely
due to reverse causality or simultaneity bias.
The results so far, indicate support for our hypothesis and they are not




One set of sensitivity analysis and robustness checks deals with alter-
native measures of explanatory variables. Now we discuss results that are run
with other measures of tariffs, financial development and various proxies for fi-
nancial development. In all of the following robustness analysis, the dependent
variable is P 95/25.
In the basic regressions reported in Table (2.4), average simple tariff of
the recent three years are used to construct measure of trade openness. The
regressions are also run with other categories of tariffs. For example, import
weighted tariffs (also from TPP database) and averages of import weighted
tariffs for two or three lagged years. The results have been in most part
similar to Table (2.4) and therefore are not repeated here 3. The reason for
similarity of results is that there is high correlation between various measures
of tariffs as evidenced in Table (2.3).
Several robustness checks are conducted with respect to various mea-
sures and proxies of Financial Obstacles or alternatively financial development.
In the original regressions, Private Credit to GDP has been used as a primary
measure of financial development (and its inverse as measure of Financial Ob-
stacles). Another common measures of financial development in the literature
is the level of stock market capitalization to GDP (denoted by Market Cap).
3Results available upon request.
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The regressions are run by including Market Capitalization alone as well as
together with private credit to GDP. The results are reported in columns (2)
and (3) of Table (2.5). The coefficient on interaction terms with Market Capi-
talization is significant at 10 percent in column (2), however when both private
credit and market capitalization are included, market capitalization is not sig-
nificant on its own. However its inclusion reduces significance of private credit
to GDP coefficient to 15 percent.
One concern is that, the Private Credit variable may not picking up fi-
nancial development but actually other aspects of development which happen
to be highly correlated with Private Credit. To address this concern, several
other measures of development such as a measure of Law and Order and also
the level of GDP per capital as an overall measure of development are used
in regressions instead of and together with Private Credit variable. The re-
sults are reported in columns (4)-(8). Similar to Market Capitalization, the
interaction coefficient on measures are significant on its own, however when
used together with Private Credit, the explanatory power of Private Credit is
larger. The result in the last column contains all the variables, however none is
identified perhaps due to high correlation of various measures of development
and the small size of the sample that does not provide enough variation to
distinguish between any of them.
One interesting observation is that in all except one of the specifications
in Table (2.5), the coefficient on the human capital interaction remains signif-
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icant at 5 percent. This seems to be signaling important channels of effects
of human capital factors on distributional features of firm size, however this
paper does not explore such aspects any deeper.
Another set of robustness analysis is conducted to further address the
causality and simultaneity issue. We have already included an instrumental
variable to address this issue, however several more direct tests are conducted
which follow conceptually from the theoretical hypothesis. Our hypothesis fo-
cuses on an specific channel through which financial development affects firms,
and that is in the context of heightened competition due to trade. Therefore
it would be another confirmation for the hypothesis, if we observed stronger
effects within high trade sectors. In order to explore this further, the sample
of country-industry pairs are divided by two depending on whether the corre-
sponding sector was among the sectors with higher or lower levels of trade. To
capture high level of trade, we focused on three ratios, export to output, im-
port to output and finally total trade as sum of export and import to output.
Within each country, sectors are divided according to being above or below
median with respect to each of these measures. The regressions are run for
these subsamples and results are reported in Table (2.6). Consistent with our
hypothesis, we see stronger effects in sectors with high exports and high trade.
The result for high import are also more significant also only at 15 percent
significance.
Overall, the robustness checks have provided further assurance about
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validity of the hypothesis. Although the small sample size and the nature of
the underlying database do not allow for more rigorous and refined analysis
of the distribution with more refined measures of disparity, the results so far
indicate an interesting and relatively robust relation/link along the lines of the
proposed mechanism.
2.3 Firm Level Analysis: Firm’s Decision to Upgrade
Technology
This section provides some more analysis on the relation of firm’s de-
cision to upgrade, trade openness and financial development. In studying this
relation, the paper has focuses on a specific mechanism to derive the hypothe-
sis. The mechanism holds that in presence of high competition pressures from
trade openness as frictions in access to finance, larger firms tend to be able to
upgrade their technology more. The previous section has focused on analyzing
the aggregate manifestation of this mechanism, namely the disparity in firm
size distribution. However this mechanisms is in the first place a hypothesis at
firm level, therefore it would be desirable to test its validity at the firm level.
Moreover, it would be more desirable to perform the analysis in the context of
less developed countries that have lower levels of financial developments. This
section intends to do that.
This section makes use of a relatively new cross country survey on firms
characteristics, statistics, decisions and the obstacles they face in the economic
environment. The Enterprise Survey is conducted by the World Bank in a large
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number of emerging and developing counties since 2000 and includes 100,000+
firms in 122 countries. The data has been collected gradually across years form
various countries and includes many small and/or developing countries from
various regions such as central Asia and eastern Europe that usually are not
present in commercially available data.
The Enterprise Survey data and the Business Size Class data each have
specific characteristics which make each of them suitable for one kind of the two
different tests that are addressed in this paper, together providing a picture at
both the firm level and distribution level. The advantage of Enterprise Survey
is that it provides data on small and developing countries which are most
relevant to an study about financial development. Moreover Enterprise Survey
provides data on firm level decisions which makes it possible to directly test the
mechanism proposed in the paper and discussed in the following subsections.
However there are some disadvantages as well. For example due to the very
nature of any survey data, the dataset comprises of the answers provided by
the firms and therefore contains some elements of subjectivity. Moreover,
even though the sample of firms in the survey is chosen to mimic the the real
distribution of firms within each country, the survey does not have enough firms
in each industry to enable us to analyze the disparities in firm size distribution.
As such, the Business Size Class is the more appropriate database for testing
disparity in firm size distribution.
The next subsections discuss the empirical strategy, the data and re-
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sults.
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy: Firm Level Analysis
The outcome variable xfij is the binary value indicating whether the
firm has upgraded its technology in the last three years and the regression is
basically a probit estimation. The test is for how outcome variable varies by
firm size and across countries with different openness and financial develop-
ment. Since we are interested in how the effect of openness varies by financial
development and firm size, we allow the coefficient on openness to vary by
financial development and firm size.
Key terms of interest are interaction effects of openness and financial
development; and of firm size, openness and financial development. The
former is a level effect moderated by the latter size-dependent effect. The
basic regression specification is
xfij = β1TOij ∗ FINDEVj + β2TOij ∗ FINDEVj ∗ Sizefij (2.2)
+ α0 + α1 ∗ sizefij + α2 ∗ TOij +
∑
γj ∗ Cj +
∑
γi ∗ Ii + +εfij
The outcome variable xfij is a binary value indicating whether the
firm f from country j and industry i has upgraded its technology in the last
three years. Here TOji and FINDEVj measure trade openness and financial
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development of country j and industry i. Country and industry dummies are
included.
The main coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. Coefficient β1 captures
the average interaction effect of trade openness and financial development. A
positive β1 indicates that increasing trade openness leads to more technology
improvement when financial institutions are more advanced. The hypothesis
for β2 is that it should be negative, implying that as access to financial services
improve, the probability of technology upgrade increases for smaller firms, and
the effect is more pronounced in countries with higher trade openness. These
are what our hypothesis lead us to expect.
2.3.2 Data
The paper uses the Enterprise Survey conducted in 2003 and 2005 in
100+ countries. Since we needed to augment this data with tariff data (from
TPP database), we dropped countries for which we did not have tariff data
at industry level. This reduced the number of countries to 58 countries from
which around 21,000 firms in manufacturing sector are included in the regres-
sions.
The survey is a long questionnaire covering firm information, actions
and firms perception of business environment. The firm-related questions cover
general information about the firms, including the sector, industry, ownership
by government or foreigners, number of permanent and temporary employees,
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wages, sales, growth of sales. In addition the survey asks qualitative questions
about the actions of the firms in recent years, such as whether they have
upgraded their technology in order to reduce costs and whether they have
initiated new products. The survey also provides various qualitative questions
on the perception of the firm about the business constraints such as financial
services, infrastructure deficiencies , corruption and such.
For the variable, xfij in the regression, we make use of one of questions
in the survey that asks the firms whether they have upgraded their technol-
ogy in the last three years. For firm’s size, we use the number of permanent
employees. In some variations of the regressions, we use the number of perma-
nent workers divided by the average number of employees in the sector. We
also include the size of the firm and some other firm characteristics directly
in the regressions. These include foreign ownership dummy and government
ownership as these variables are likely to have an effect on the ability of the
firm to access finance and/or new technologies.
The sources of data for trade openness and country level variables such
as financial development are similar to the previous section; These are obtained
from TPP database, World Development Indicators and Penn World Tables.
2.3.3 Results
The results of basic regression (2.2) on the probability of firm tech-
nology upgrade are reported in Table (2.7), column (3). The result confirms
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the prediction of a positive level effect and a negative slope effect for the in-
teraction effects. The results also point to the significance of the coefficient
on size of the firms. In order to make sure the coefficient on the triple inter-
action term TO*FINDEV*log(employment) is not driven simply because of
log(employment), two first columns in Table (2.7) show the effect of each term
alone. Even though size seems to be a very strong predictor of the outcome
variable, the first two columns indicate that the interaction term TO*FINDEV
is playing a role as well.
In some specifications of the regressions, other characteristics such as
foreign and government ownership are included. Column (4) shows that the
coefficient on foreign ownership is not significant. The reason could be that
foreign firms might be generally more technologically advanced and therefore
we might not see a lot of upgrades in these firms. Another reason could be in
our sample foreign firms are generally larger than domestic firms, therefore ef-
fect of foreign ownership dummy is likely to be picked up by the size dummy.
Another firm size variable included is the government ownership which ap-
pears negative and significant. The reason to include government ownership
was the possibility that government ownership helps the firms to access finance
through local state banks and directed government loans, therefore this might
be a critical variable in probability of technology upgrade especially in develop-
ing world. However the coefficient appears negative. The reason could be that
other factors are at play as well, for example the smaller need of government-
owned firms to upgrade their technology since due to government support they
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are less concerned about improving efficiency and remaining competitive. In
some specifications, we made use of other firm level variables available in the
survey, however they are not reported in the table due to reasons explained
shortly. For example, the survey includes questions on the number of com-
petitors a firm has, whether the elasticity of their product to a %10 increase
in price is low or high, what percentage of their customers would switch away
from them if they raised the price by %10. These question provide information
about the level of competition in the industry and the incentives of the firm for
technology upgrade, so the potentially are good candidates for inclusion in the
regressions. However the coverage of these variables is very poor and including
them reduces the sample size in some country-industry pairs drastically to a
point which makes cross country-cross industry comparison less reliable.
Table (??) also provides the results of regressions on several subsam-
ples. The results for a sample of domestic firms only is similar to the overall
sample results, this is not surprising as the foreign ownership dummy was also
non significant as explained above. As the size appears an important vari-
able, Column (6) provides results for a subsample of smaller firms, those that
are smaller than the median in the corresponding country-industry pair. It is
interesting that the coefficient on the interaction term with size is smaller(in
absolute value) and less significant now, and the coefficient on the standalone
size variable is larger. This means the importance of size is more pronounced
within smaller firms. The results for exporters is surprising. The presup-
position was an exception of having larger and more significant results for
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this subsample. This might be meaning that effects of tariff, trade and size
influence the whole industry whether or not a firm is a exporter. Another ex-
planation could be that exporters are in general larger (in our database, they
are about 4 times larger than non-exporters), therefore the effect of size within
their subsample is already taken into account. The comparison of small firms
and exporter subsamples is interesting and points to the pattern that effect of
size in our regression are better identified within samples of smaller firms.
Finally the last column, sheds some light on the issue that whether
FINDEV is identifying financial development or the general development of
the country. To address this, last column reports the results for a regression
which includes GDP per capita as a proxy for general development of a country.
Though significant, their effect is much smaller compared to coefficients on
FINDEV and does not reduce the significance of FINDEV interactions.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that is consistent with financial
development having a differential impact across firms within an industry. I
find that financial obstacles increase the firm size inequality and the effects
are more pronounced in country-industries with more trade openness. Also the
paper detects that in addition to the overall effects, financial development has
a differential impact on firms according to their size and increases the chance
of technology upgrades for smaller firms more than it does for larger firms,
again these effects are more pronounced in presence of increased competition
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due to trade openness.
By focusing on the changes in relative size of firms, this paper points to
the reallocation of resources within industry due to financial development and
trade. This raises an interesting question for further studies that how these




Table 2.1: List of Countries in the Empirical Analysis of Chapter 2











Japan Costa Rica Oman
Korea Czech Republic Philippines
Netherlands Ecuador Poland
New Zealand Egypt Portugal
Portugal Spain Romania
Slovak Republic Estonia Russia













Table 2.2: Correlations between Measures of Disparity in Firm Size Distribu-
tion
P 95/75 P 95/50 P 95/25 P 75/50 P 75/25 P 50/25
P 95/75 1
P 95/50 0.7043∗ 1
P 95/25 0.6628∗ 0.9354∗ 1
P 75/50 −0.0208 0.2665∗ 0.2666∗ 1
P 75/25 0.0379∗ 0.1017∗ 0.2893∗ 0.6078∗ 1
P 50/25 −0.03747 −0.0317∗ 0.1497∗ −0.0173 0.4177∗ 1
Table 2.3: Correlations between Measures of Tariffs
Simple Simple Simple Weighted Weighted Weighted
tariff tariff tariff tariff tariff tariff
(t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2)
Simple tariff 1
Simple tariff (t-1) 0.9194 1
Simple tariff (t-2) 0.8603 0.9071 1
Weighted tariff 0.9397 0.8792 0.8271 1
Weighted tariff (t-1) 0.8642 0.9333 0.8595 0.9203 1
Weighted tariff (t-2) 0.7993 0.8494 0.9281 0.8573 0.9007 1
Tariff data is from Trade, Production and Protection database, Nicita and Olagarreaga (2001)
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Table 2.4: Disparity in Firm Size Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES P 95/25 P 95/75 P 95/50 P 75/50 P 75/25 P 50/25
TO ∗ FINOBST 299.45* 81.08 254.56* 8.46 14.75** 0.59
(0.082) (0.133) (0.095) (0.130) (0.050) (0.688)
K 88.38 45.07 168.56 5.43 -0.10 -2.47
(0.566) (0.288) (0.278) (0.745) (0.995) (0.135)
N 18,155.74 7,682.53 9,896.54 -4,393.94 -4,240.49 88.89
(0.642) (0.423) (0.799) (0.359) (0.345) (0.856)
H 717.00** 62.74 258.91* 15.22 40.27* 1.26
(0.036) (0.169) (0.099) (0.433) (0.086) (0.732)
EXT ∗ FINOBST -862.50 837.64 1,755.59 -67.66 -289.48 -42.90
(0.854) (0.428) (0.559) (0.759) (0.398) (0.370)
RD ∗ FINOBST dropped 566.57 -22,371.45 -3,904.15 -2,972.10 309.20
(0.971) (0.534) (0.185) (0.445) (0.586)
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239
Adjusted R-squared 0.287 0.365 0.248 0.076 0.296 0.325
Note. P-values from heteroskedasticty robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *.
All regressions include country and industry dummies.
All regressions include interaction of legal origin and TO as Instrumental Variables.
TO= Measure of trade openness, 100- simple tariff averaged over 3 years
FINOBST= Measure Financial Obstacles. Inverse of Private Credit to GDP
EXT= Measure of dependence on external finance
RD= Measure R&D intensity
K= Country Capital Stock per worker * Capital Intensity of the Industry
N= Country Natural Resource per capita * Natural Resource Intensity of the Industry








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Disparity in Firm Size Distributions, Robustness Checks in Sub-
samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES High Low High Low High Low
Import Import Export Export Trade Trade
TO ∗ FINOBST 207.33 533.04 1,462.01** -157.91 623.31** -262.73
(0.127) (0.204) (0.013) (0.301) (0.013) (0.289)
K 89.94 1.20 -20.98 -1.42 -18.64 16.64
(0.592) (0.370) (0.410) (0.379) (0.467) (0.614)
N 843.16 -29,179.94 24,847.91 -112,679.63 74,489.96 19,076.17
(0.982) (0.266) (0.631) (0.364) (0.211) (0.583)
H 575.00 73.95 975.84** -439.45 911.25** 169.31
(0.144) (0.630) (0.025) (0.392) (0.034) (0.378)
EXT ∗ FINOBST 2,547.68 3,301.03 3,562.06 2,367.85 -826.30 -2,796.63
(0.744) (0.192) (0.679) (0.464) (0.918) (0.290)
RD ∗ FINOBST -31,005.59 -123,491.63 -170,145.12 128,420.61 -69,671.62 164,974.10
(0.720) (0.324) (0.141) (0.283) (0.432) (0.265)
Observations 130 109 130 109 130 109
Adjusted R-squared 0.425 0.611 0.261 0.976 0.248 0.981
Note. P-values from heteroskedasticty robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *.
All regressions include country and industry dummies and Legal Origin as instrumental variable.
TO= Measure of trade openness, 100- simple tariff averaged over 3 years
K, H, N are interactions of country factor endowment and industry factor intensity.
Subsample regressions:
High (Low) Import= sectors with import/output higher (lower) than median
High (Low) Export= sectors with export/output higher (lower) than median
High (Low) Trade= sectors with (export+import)/output higher (lower) than median
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Table 2.7: Firm Level Analysis, Results and Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES uptech uptech uptech uptech Domestic Small Exporter GDP
Firms Firms Only
log(employment) 1853*** 1914*** 1452*** 1503*** 1581*** 2293*** 714*** 1433***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
TO* FINDEV 166*** 122*** 123*** 106*** 153*** 102* 139***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.000)
TO*FINDEV - 11*** -11*** -10*** -8 ** -15*** - 16***





TO* GDP per capita -0
(0.329)
TO* GDP per capita -0***
*log(employment) (0.001)
Observations 21217 20792 20792 20771 17940 10477 6101 20792
R-squared 0.1373 0.1389 0.1398 0.1404 0.1470 0.1414 0.0803 0.1403
Note. P-values from heteroskedasticty robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and *.
Coefficients are multiplied by 10000 for ease of presentation.
All regressions include country and industry dummies.
TO= Measure of trade openness, 100- simple tariff averaged over 3 years
FINDEV= Measure of financial development, private credit to gdp averaged over 3 years
Small firms are those smaller than median in each country-industry
76
Table 2.8: ISIC codes
ISIC 2 ISIC 3 ISIC 2 Description
311-312 151, 152, 153, 154 Food Products
313 155 Beverages
314 160 (16) Tobacco
321 171, 172,173 (17) Textiles
322 181,182 Apparel, except footware
323 191 Leather products except footware and apparel
324 192 Manufacture of footware, except rubber or plastic
331 201,202 (20) Wood products except furniture
332 361, 202 Furniture except metal
341 210 (21) Paper and paper products
342 221,222,223 (22) Printing and publishing
351 233,241,242 Industrial chemicals
352 242 Other chemicals
353 232 Petrolum refineries
354 231,232, 269 Misc. products of petrolum and coal
355 251 Rubber products
356 252 Plastic products n.e.c.
361 269 Pottery, china and earthenware
362 261,332 Glass and glass products
369 269 Other non-metallic mineral products
371 271 Iron and steel industries
372 272 Non-ferrous metal industries
381 281, 289 Fabricated metal product
382 289, 291,292,300 Machinery except electrical
383 293,311,312,313,315,319,321,322,323,331 Electrical machinery
384 341,342,343 (34), 351,352,353,354,359 (35) Transport equipment
385 331,332, 333 Professional and scientific
390 369 Other manufacturing
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Chapter 3
Terms of Trade in the North-South Trade
3.1 Introduction
This paper aims to investigate a long held view on the deterioration of
terms of trade in North-South trade. It has been widely argued in the past by
academics and policy makers in low income countries that as the world grows,
demand shifts away from the south that specializes in low income elasticity
goods and towards the north. As such industrial policy advocates generally
suggest that a developing country needs to transform the composition of its
production towards goods with higher income elasticities to enjoy benefits of
world growth, see Evans (1987).
To investigate this issue, a simple version of a Ricardian model of trade
is used as the basis for a simulation exercise. Original Ricardian models have
homothetic preferences and therefore are not proper vehicles to address issues
related to asymmetry in the specialization of goods with respect to their income
elasticity. However several variations of Ricardian models with non-homothetic
preferences exist which are proper tools in the North-South trade context. This
paper develops a numerical simulation exercise based on one of such papers
by by Matsuyama (2000).
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The model is a version of static Ricardian model with a continuum of
goods and unit demand non-homothetic preferences. In this model one country
(south) has comparative advantage in production of goods with lower income
elasticity of demand. One prediction of this model is that due to a uniform
global improvement in technology, i.e. smaller unit labor requirements, the
terms of trade moves against south.
To test this prediction, I will have a selection of south and north coun-
tries. I will model the unit labor requirements stochastically and calibrate the
parameters of the model to trade and production moments for a steady state
equilibrium in the past, say time t0. To investigate the implications of world
growth on the terms of trade and welfare, I will calculate the equilibrium at a
later time, say time t1 by introducing a %50 global improvement in unit labor
requirements in the calibrated model. I will simulate the model at time t1 for
1000 times and compare the average of terms of trade at t1 with that of t0.
My result provides some support on the accuracy of the prediction using
a model-based numerical exercise.
3.2 Model
The numerical exercise is based on a variation of Ricardian model of
trade as developed in Matsuyama (2000). Similar to the classic Ricardian
model, trade takes place due to technological differences however contrary to
the classic model, the agents have non-homothetic preferences. There is a
continuum of competitive industries, indexed by z ∈ [0,∞). The unit labor
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requirements in home and foreign country are denoted by a(z) and a∗(z) re-
spectively. We assume a
∗(z)
a(z)
is strictly decreasing, meaning home’s comparative
advantage in low indexes. If we normalize wage in foreign country to 1, and
denote wage at home by w, then pattern of specialization is given by
p(z) = wa(z), z ∈ [0,m]
p(z) = a∗(z), z ∈ [m,∞)





The population in home and foreign is given by N and N∗. Consumers
may have different skills given by distributions F (h) and F (h∗). A home
agent with skill h earns wh and a foreign agents with skill h∗ earns h∗. Each











x(z) ∈ {0, 1}.












will be decreasing. This determines the order that households purchase goods,
and due to this specification, this order will be the same as that of home’s
comparative advantage.
Each household with income I starts buying goods in the order they
are indexed until he exhausts all of his money. In particular, the household in






min{wa(z), a∗(z)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(z)
x(z)dz = wh







a(s)ds, 0}dF (h)︸ ︷︷ ︸










a(s)ds}dF ∗(h∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of home exports
(3.2)
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) pin down the equilibrium values of m,w and
hence the equilibrium itself. In the case of homogeneous agents, there will
be cutoffs m < u < u∗ where the following patterns of consumption and
production materialize: goods in [0,m] are produced by south and consumed
by both the north and the south; goods in [m,u] are produced by the north
and consumed by both countries; goods in [u, u∗] are produced in north and
consumed by the north only, and finally goods in (u∗,∞) are not produced.
The equilibrium characterization in this model is pinned down by some
cutoff points due to the special ordering of the goods. The model imposes
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two orderings on goods, by comparative advantage and elasticities, namely







To examine the effects of technology improvement, Matsuyama (2000)
performs a comparative analysis by assuming the rate of technology improve-
ment to be given by
da(z)
a(z)




with positive g(z) meaning technology improvement. By differentiating the
equilibrium equations (3.1) and (3.2) it can be shown that in case of uniform
improvement, i.e. g(z) = g∗(z) = k, the terms of trade, w, moves against the
south. The idea is that improvement in technology leads to higher income for
north; Due to unit demand for goods, this does not create more demand for
southern goods and shifts the demand to rather higher indexed goods. More-
over with lower unit labor requirements, for south to clear its labor markets
it expands range of its produced goods to the ones with less comparative
advantage and this lowers its terms of trade further more.
In the next section, I develop a strategy to numerically test the mech-
anism and the predictions of the model described above.
3.3 Testing the Model
In this section I will first explain the choice of countries and will explain
why they could be considered as good candidates representing the south and
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north countries, specifically with respect to the strong assumption imposed on
their pattern of specialization. Then I will describe the algorithm developed
to test the predictions and then the results are reported.
3.3.1 Choice of Countries
In the model, south will specialize in producing goods with low income
elasticity, goods which each consumer starts off by consuming one unit and
then moving on to higher indexed goods representing more luxurious goods as
the income increases.
The commodity producing countries can be good candidates as south-
ern countries producing low income elasticity goods. The only problem with
that can be the argument that some commodities like oil do not satisfy the unit
demand preference condition. However it should be noted that even though,
oil itself may not fall into that category, many oil producing countries do not
produce high-tech and luxurious goods and do not have strong medium or
high-tech industries. Therefore, I hold that commodity producing countries,
especially oil producing counties can be good candidates representing the south
country in the model if we exclude the oil from their economy. As such, I will
use oil producing countries as the south and the OECD countries as north.
At this stage, the paper has only focused on Iran (oil excluded) as the south
county versus OECD- excluding Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech, Slovakia and
Poland due to lack of data for these countries before 1980’s.
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For comparative analysis, I will look at two time snapshots: averages of
years 1970-1977 and years 1997-2003. The choice is due to availability of trade
data for Iran. The test involves assuming a %50 global technology improve-
ment at time t1 with respect to the same pattern of comparative advantage at
time t0. Assuming same pattern of comparative advantage over such a long pe-
riod of time may seem a strong assumption, however examining trade patterns
provides support for this assumption. The composition and magnitude of top
non-oil export items of Iran, shows that we can assume south (Iran) has not
gained significant comparative advantage in other industries over time. Fig-
ures (3.1) and (3.2) show the same 4-digit SITC codes that comprise a largest
part of Iran’s non oil export over the two time periods. Moreover figures
(3.3) and (3.4) show that oil still keeps a significant share in Iran’s export.
I conclude, that doing a comparative analysis over the mentioned two time
period, keeping everything fixed except a %50 improvement on same relative
advantages between Iran and OECD constitute a reasonable assumption.
3.3.2 Algorithm
While the equilibrium of the model and production patterns are easily
described by two equations (3.1) and (3.2), it is hard to apply this ordering
of goods to data. The model imposes two orderings on goods, by comparative







. Even though this makes the analytical characterizations easy, it is
empirically hard to estimate the unit cost requirement as well as the function
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b(z). Moreover there is no chance that they have any monotonicity patterns
similar to the model.
I will take an approach similar to Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) method of
estimating a Ricardian model. I will treat a(z), a∗(z) and b(z) as random
variables. To discretize the goods space, I consider goods indexed by i =
1, 2, 3, ...In equilibrium the number of goods will be determined endogenously.
Since the number of consumed goods is endogenous, to prevent it from
getting too large and computationally problematic, I incorporate a variable
J = 100 in the distribution of a∗(i), I assume log a∗(i) is distributed uniformly
in [−1 + log 1
J
, 1 + log 1
J
]. Hence on average log a∗ equals log 1
J
and approxi-
mately on average a∗ is bounded by a multiple of 1
J
. In other words, the north
country consumer can at most consume a multiple of J = 100 northern goods
. Throughout the simulations, the northern consumers at most consumed a to-
tal of 500 goods. In the program I draw the variables for 1000 goods, meaning
the possibility of production of 1000 goods in the the world economy but this
limit never was reached.
To allow for absolute advantage, I assume log( a(i)
a∗(i)
) is distributed uni-




) ∼ U [−1 + β, 1 + β]
hence on average log( a(i)
a∗(i)
) equals β. In case β = 0, countries on average have
similar technologies, and for β > 0 , on average north has absolute advantage.
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To model b(z), I assume it is a uniform distribution in [0, 1] and nega-
tively correlated with log( a(i)
a∗(i)
) with a parameter −ρ . This correlation is used
to capture the property of the model, that south has comparative advantage in
goods with low income elasticities, those which everybody consumes for sure.1
Constructing draws for a(i), a∗(i), b(i) based on above specifications,
given any w, the prices of goods are determined by the costs associated with
it, i.e. p(i) = min{wa(i), a∗(i)}. Then b(i)
p(i)
are decreasingly ordered and con-
sumers of each country consume one unit of the goods in such order as far as
their total income allows. This income for home country is w and for foreign
is 1. The program will search over values of w to find the one that satisfies
the balanced budget equation.
To determine the parameters β and ρ, two model moments will be
matched with the data moments , those are ratio of exports to production for
south and ratio of two countries productions. The relative size of countries N
and N∗ is an average of two countries labor force populations over the period
1970-1977. The program searches over a range of β ∈ [0,∞) (practically
β ∈ [0, 3]) and ρ ∈ [0, 1] to find β∗ and ρ∗ that match the above moments to
those of data in years 1970-1977.
1To create correlated uniform random variables in Matlab, I used Matlab function mvn-
rnd to create standard normal random variables x, y with correlation ρ. Applying the cdf
of standard normal Ψ, we get uniform random variables Ψ(x) and Ψ(y). The correlation of
Ψ(x) and Ψ(y) is not exactly ρ but is an increasing function of ρ and that is enough for the
purpose here.
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After finding β∗ and ρ∗, I perform a comparative analysis. Within two
time periods 1970-1979 and 1997-2003 the average gross output per worker
has raised to 1.5 fold for the total economies considered here. I simulate the
model, by drawing a, a∗ and b from the above distributions with parameters
β∗ and ρ∗, however after that, I scale the unit labor requirements a and a∗
by 1.5 to simulate the results of a %50 technology improvement. I draw 1000
different realizations of the economy. I calculate the equilibrium in each case
and average over the terms of trade. Results are reported in next subsection.
For this exercise, I have used gross output as a measure of production
instead of GDP. The reason is that export data is reported in total value
rather than value added. Moreover, as explained in previous subsection, I
have excluded the oil production from the gross output for Iran. Also the
exports of both Iran and OECD counties to other countries are excluded from
their gross outputs for the purpose of this exercise.
Bilateral trade data (SITC.Rev1) is taken from the united nation’s
statistical division’s Comtrade database . However detailed trade data for
Iran is not available for years 1978-1996 and that is the reason for the choice
of specific time intervals in this paper.
The data on gross output for OECD countries is taken from OECD’s
STAN database. For a number of countries that were not members of OECD
before 1980’s, the series was interpolated backwards to obtain missing points.
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The production data for Iran is taken from the Iranian national statistical
center.
3.3.3 Results
Results of the calibration of the model to 1970-1977 moments as well
as simulation for 1997-2003 are summarized in the following table.
The calibrated model behaves poorly in fitting the ratio of export to
gross output and ratio of gross outputs. However the model performs well
in capturing the size and direction of terms of trade movement in data even
though that moment was not tried to be matched. One reason of the failure
of the model in matching the output and export moments, can be the relative
small size of Iran(without oil) versus the OECD countries. The reduction of
terms of trade, predicted by the model can be seen in this version of estimating
his model.
Table 3.1: Results, North-South Trade
1970-1977 1997-2003
Model Data Model Data
Terms of Trade 0.120 0.103 0.110 0.100
Ratio of per capita export 4.3 7.8 6.1 9.8
Ratio of export/output for south 0.02 0.001 0.03 0.004
utility north/south 1.3 1.4
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Figure 3.1: Iran: Share of 6 Top Codes in Non Oil Exports 1963-1977
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Figure 3.2: Iran: Share of 6 Top Codes in Non Oil Exports 1997-2003
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Figure 3.3: Iran: Share of Oil in Exports 1963-1977
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Figure 3.4: Iran: Share of Oil in Exports 1997-2003
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Figure 3.5: Iran: GDP and Oil Production 1963-1977
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Figure 3.6: Iran: GDP and Oil Production 1997-2003
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